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Supplementary Article: Interpreting PRC History

24 Dec 74

No. 52



TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Interpreting PRC History


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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW HITS TRADE BILL RESTRICTIONS, AVOIDS THREATS

Initial comment on Congressional passage of the trade bill on 20 December suggests that Moscow wants to avoid any further escalation of its recent protest over the linkage of the bill to Jewish emigration. Although the comment echoes the indignation over the issue expressed in the TASS statement of 18 December, it contains no substantial hints that Moscow is contemplating anything more than rhetorical protests at this time. This appears to confirm the impressions of Western observers that Moscow's protest over the issue was essentially a face saving maneuver designed to extricate the Soviet Union from an embarrassing public position.

THE 18 DECEMBER DOCUMENTS The TASS statement issued on the 18th denounced the efforts allegedly being made in the United States to tie the trade bill to conditions affecting Jewish emigration. Moscow also issued a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Kissinger, dated 26 October, which purportedly detailed the extent of the understanding reached between the two governments on this issue.

The TASS statement was carefully contrived to convey a maximum of indignation with a minimum of specific commitment. Noting that the "understanding in principle" reached in 1972 had called for the removal of "discriminatory restrictions" in U.S. trade legislation, the statement declared that progress in this direction had been systematically stalled and hampered in the United States. Ascribing this obstructionism to unnamed "opponents of a normalization of Soviet-American trade," it denounced the efforts allegedly being made in the United States to attach "reservations and demands" to the trade bill as a "gross interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs." It went on to warn that the adoption by the U.S. Congress of such limiting conditions would "run directly counter to the clear obligations of the parties to the 1972 trade agreement."

Although this statement carries an implied threat of retaliatory action, the immediately following paragraph, which seems to be the operative one, watered it down considerably. It stated that the

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"leading circles" of the Soviet Union categorically reject as "inadmissible" any attempts to interfere in affairs that are entirely within the internal competence of the Soviet state. The ascription of the rejection to "leading circles" is normal in TASS statements and in effect leaves the Soviet Government uncommitted.

Gromyko's letter to Kissinger contested the accuracy of statements allegedly made in the United States regarding the nature of the understanding reached between the two governments on Jewish emigration, asserting that the Soviet Union had not only not agreed to any liberalization in this regard, but had actually informed the U.S. Government that the trend in Jewish emigration would be likely to go down. Since the statements in question included the assurances given to Senator Jackson by Secretary Kissinger, the letter amounts in effect to a questioning of the Secretary's accuracy. Such a breach of diplomatic etiquette suggests that the Soviet Government believed that countervailing needs were compelling. The Soviet Government may have felt that a clearing of the record was required to assure domestic or foreign communist party critics that the Soviet leadership had not knuckled under to Western pressure.

COMMENT ON TRADE BILL The comment on the passage of the trade bill has included a spate of items which generally reiterate the substance of the 18 December documents. The most substantial comment to date was a Moscow observers' roundtable discussion on 22 December which reinforced the substance of the official protest by drawing on Brezhnev's speech in Moscow to the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council on 15 October. One of the commentators drew attention to Brezhnev's discreet reminder that restrictions on U.S. trade would make the United States less competitive than other Western countries as a trading partner for the Soviet Union. The comment has contained no substantial indications that the Soviet Union is contemplating anything more than rhetorical protests at this time. One exception was a routine radio commentary to North America which warned against misjudging the Soviet protest as an empty gesture. This, however, can be safely discounted as a serious expression of official views.

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ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE

USSR MARKS GENEVA ANNIVERSARY WITH BARBS AT QUIET DIPLOMACY

Moscow has marked the first anniversary of the 21 December opening of the Middle East peace conference in Geneva with renewed calls for speedy resumption of the talks, continued accusations of Israeli efforts to undermine the conference, and further digs at the U.S. preference for phased negotiations. The anniversary prompted a 20 December commentary by TASS' Yuriy Trushin, articles by Tsaplin in PRAVDA on the 21st and by Kudryavtsev in IZVESTIYA on the 22d--both reviewed by TASS--and a Medvedko radio commentary on the 21st.

Trushin's TASS commentary, like other recent comment, represented the Soviet-U.S. and Soviet-French communiques on Brezhnev's talks with Presidents Ford and Giscard d'Estaing as having stressed the "pressing need for speediest resumption" of the Geneva talks. (Both communiques said only that the conference should "resume its work as soon as possible.") Doubt that the United States was supporting the conference in the spirit of the U.S.-Soviet communique was suggested in a Moscow domestic service commentary on 15 December. The broadcast asserted that Israeli Foreign Minister Allon during his Washington talks a few days earlier had "foisted on the White House" his own conditions "which clearly go against the decisions of the Vladivostok meeting." Citing the Washington POST, the broadcast said that the United States had "agreed unwillingly" to Israel's procedure for separate talks although this effectively postponed the convening of the Geneva conference.

The anniversary comment repeated past Soviet complaints that Israel and its "traditional patrons abroad" were seeking to replace a general political settlement with "talks between groups or bilateral talks" to effect partial agreements aimed at weakening the unity of the Arab countries. Tsaplin in PRAVDA declared Soviet opposition to attempts to "stop at half measures" which would only create an illusion of solving the conflict. Medvedko and Trushin both credited the two-day Geneva conference last year with laying the groundwork for disengagement on the Sinai and Golan fronts; Medvedko blandly went on to assert that subsequent efforts to follow up disengagement with "other steps" had proved the "ineffectiveness" of quiet diplomacy.

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IZVESTIYA's Kudryavtsev, reiterating the line that Israel was trying to split the Arab community, asserted by way of illustration that "the Israeli aggressors and their international instigators" were trying to persuade Egypt into separate negotiations and agreements, "hinting that Egypt will, you see, have the captured lands in Sinai returned in exchange for a final agreement with Israel."

CAIRO "CLARIFICATIONS" Egyptian sensitivity to any such hints of a sellout of Cairo's Arab allies, particularly Syria, was promptly reflected in leading articles in AL-AHRAM and AL-AKHBAR, as reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 23d. The papers may also have read in Kudryavtsev's comments a veiled warning against Egyptian acceptance of a second round of U.S.-sponsored negotiations with Israel over Sinai. President as-Sadat has declared, with some urgency, his readiness to move in that direction, presumably hoping to have some progress in hand before welcoming Brezhnev to Egypt.

The Cairo press response to IZVESTIYA aimed at dispelling any erroneous impressions about Egypt's commitment to Arab solidarity that "the organ of the friendly Soviet Government" might unwittingly have conveyed. AL-AKHBAR chief editor Musa Sabri, quoting the offending IZVESTIYA passage, offered assurances that Kudryavtsev's remarks were undoubtedly well intended but said he nevertheless felt impelled to provide a "sound clarification" since the IZVESTIYA article might give an opportunity to "those who try to distort Egypt's firm national stand, to misconstrue these words and come out with interpretations which we believe the Soviet Government paper did not intend."

Musa Sabri affected a tone of sincere desire to correct any wrong impressions arising from the IZVESTIYA article at a time when Egypt "is preparing to receive Brezhnev and considers his visit a turning point toward the further strengthening of relations" between the two countries and peoples. AL-AHRAM's editorial approached the subject somewhat more cautiously, but also pointed out that Egypt attached "extreme importance" to Brezhnev's visit, and expressed confidence that "the Soviet friends are fully aware" of Egypt's role in the Middle East and its willingness to suffer not only for the sake of Sinai but for all the occupied territories.

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President as-Sadat, in a Chicago DAILY NEWS interview reported by Cairo radio on the 24th, said there was still an opportunity to find a settlement "on the basis of Kissinger's formula," but indicated that there could be no delay. The United States "must move quickly" to prevent the danger of war, he said, adding later that "we must work in a speedy way." While declaring that he was still optimistic, he said that "however, this is a turning point; I want the officials of the U.S. State Department to realize this."

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MBFR

PACT SAYS NEXT MOVE UP TO NATO, CHARGES "CONCEPTUAL INERTIA"

The public assessment by Moscow and its East European allies of the fourth round of the Vienna force reduction negotiations (MBFR), now in recess until 27 January, places the responsibility for the lack of progress after more than a year of talks squarely on the NATO side. Comment has taken the Western participants to task repeatedly for allegedly not offering any substantive changes in their original November 1973 proposal, while crediting the Warsaw Pact states with "flexibility." The Pact has been praised for trying to break the impasse by introducing such "compromise" moves as the call for initial step reductions in 1975. Another Pact proposal--for a freeze on armed forces and arms in the area under negotiations while the talks are in progress--has also now been acknowledged, at the lowest level of Soviet comment, in a Moscow Radio Peace and Progress commentary in German on the 17th.

Chief Soviet delegate Oleg Khlestov, in a TASS interview on the 13th, the day after the last plenary session before the recess, repeated the long-standing charge that the basic NATO negotiating position was "unrealistic" and based on an "unjust approach." A Semenov TASS commentary on the 12th, published in PRAVDA the following day, conveyed the general attitude that "it is now up to the West." Warsaw's prominent MBFR commentator Andrzej Rayzacher, in an article in the daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 18th, summed up the East's view in observing that the Western participants were suffering from "conceptual inertia."

At the same time, there have been some hints of guarded optimism for progress in the fifth round, perhaps related to the possibility that the NATO participants might introduce the issue of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, a subject which the Pact since the beginning has adamantly demanded be included in the talks. Rayzacher in his article on the 18th called the news reports on statements by Secretary Kissinger and the Dutch defense minister at the recent NATO Brussels meetings regarding the extension of MBFR to tactical nuclear weapons as "harbingers" for the fifth round. Secretary Kissinger was cited as saying that although it was "necessary" to extend the framework of the MBFR talks, "the proper time 'has not arrived for it yet.'"

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

EUROPEAN PARTIES REMAIN SPLIT ON FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE

The 19-21 December Budapest meeting of European communist parties has apparently failed to reconcile the differences over the format and agenda of the forthcoming European regional conference, scheduled for East Berlin in 1975, which were registered at the Warsaw consultative meeting of the same parties in October. The issue of majority rule versus the unanimity principle again emerged as a bone of contention, with the Moscow-leaning parties lining up against the independents, Romania and Yugoslavia. And the question of whether the conference should take a stand on China was again passed over in silence, a sure sign of deep-seated differences over the issue. Judging by the communique of the meeting and the leading speeches, the positions of the contending sides on these issues have hardened rather than softened with the passage of time.

The communique appeared to register an agreement to disagree pending further study of the issues. It announced that an editorial commission, open to "all" participating parties, had been set up to prepare the agenda for next year's conference. While it described the atmosphere of the meeting as one of "mutual understanding, equality, and proletarian solidarity," it also noted that there had been a "wide-ranging exchange of views." Moreover, unlike the Warsaw communique, it did not describe this exchange as "friendly," nor did it say that the proceedings were pervaded by a spirit of "democracy."

KADAR SPEECH As the host of the conference and the keynote speaker, Hungarian party first secretary Kadar appeared to assume the role of honest broker between the contending sides. He paid deference to the views of the Romanians and Yugoslavs by acknowledging that there was no "center or leading party" in the communist movement, but he took the majority position in insisting that the forthcoming conference should reach joint decisions. Reminding that the Comintern had been dissolved decades ago, Kadar asserted that the parties were indeed independent but then declared flatly that this was "not enough," and that the parties should meet from time to time to "coordinate their actions." These

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remarks were presumably in response to those by Yugoslav delegate Grlickov at the Warsaw consultative meeting in October to the effect that there must no longer be, as in the past, any direction of the communist movement from "one center." Repeatedly emphasizing unity, joint action and collectivity, Kadar pointed out that, while each party would participate in the conference in accordance with its own circumstances, it must be "imbued by responsibility for the common cause." Each party's success or failure is inextricably intertwined with that of the whole movement, he declared, and a strong European communist movement will not only strengthen European peace and security but also the prestige of each communist party on the continent. Kadar's remarks on the absence of a leading center and on the Comintern, included in the MTI prerelease of the speech, were omitted from TASS' report.

PONOMAREV SPEECH The speech by Soviet chief delegate Ponomarev on the 20th was, judging by the TASS report, a more hard-line statement than the one he made at the Warsaw meeting in October. The European CP's, he declared, must adopt "principled, class positions," in line with the stance of the Soviet side in the East-West summit meetings in recent years, and they can best serve European peace and security from a base of unity and cohesion on Marxist-Leninist principles. In an implicit swipe at Peking, Ponomarev stressed that the European CP conference must take a stand against all purveyors of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism "in Europe and beyond it."

As in Warsaw, the China issue was generally avoided, and there was apparent silence this time regarding the goal of a world communist party conference as a followup to the European one.* The inevitability of a world conference was, however, implicitly stressed by Tellalov, representing the Bulgarian CP, who asserted that the 1975 East Berlin conference must take into account that Europe "cannot be separated by a 'Chinese wall' from the rest of the world."

* At Warsaw, the only publicized mention of a world conference was one by Yugoslavia's Grlickov, who stressed that there were at present no conditions warranting the convening of a world conclave.

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ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA Andrei and Grlickov, who again represented the Romanian and Yugoslav parties, respectively, continued in their speeches on the 20th to withhold any commitment by their parties to participate in the further preparations or to attend the final European CP conference. The two independents were more explicit than they had been at Warsaw in insisting that the main document to be issued by next year's conference must represent a "consensus" of all the participating parties, thus ruling out a document adopted by majority vote which could be repugnant to the independents. Romanian CP Secretary Andrei, as reported by AGERPRES on the 21st, went to the lengths of remarking that his party saw no absolute need to have any final conference document other than a brief communique, stressing that the important thing was rather to get the statements by each of the conference delegates on public record. The RCP, he added, was willing to go along with a consensus final document, provided that it did not include "tasks" for the participating parties or otherwise infringe upon their autonomy.

Similarly, LCY Secretary Grlickov declared that there was room in the final conference document only for "those assessments, attitudes and proposals which are acceptable to all" the conference participants, and that it must be prepared and adopted only by consensus. He added the demand that the draft of the final document be given to the leaderships of the participating parties for their consideration well in advance of the conference. A talk by Zagreb radio commentator Sundic on the 21st, portraying a harder-line atmosphere at the Budapest meeting than at Warsaw two months ago, was restrained in remarking only that there were "no grounds to cast doubts" on the success of the editorial commission set up at the latest meeting and that the participating parties' differences were not "insuperable obstacles" to convening next year's conference.

On the 23d, Sundic critically noted, without mentioning Ponomarev directly, that the CPSU had equated anti-Sovietism with anti-communism at the Budapest meeting. Sundic interpreted this as an unacceptable Soviet ploy to get the China issue on the agenda of the European CP conference.

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VIETNAM

HANOI MEETING MARKS 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

North Vietnam's celebration of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) was highlighted by a 22 December "grand meeting" in Hanoi attended by First Secretary Le Duan and other top leaders of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP). In addition to the keynote address by Defense Minister Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, the meeting heard the usual brief opening statement by Premier Pham Van Dong, and National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh presented the VPA with an award.

In his speech to the anniversary meeting, Giap maintained that the "revolutionary forces" in Vietnam at present "are definitely stronger than the counterrevolutionary forces" and will continue to increase in strength. Leaving open the possibility of a political solution in South Vietnam, he warned that the United States must choose between "two paths," either implementing the Paris agreement and ending "military involvement" in Vietnam or inviting "increasingly heavier and more disastrous setbacks" by following its past course, "sabotaging" the agreement and "clinging" to Thieu. Giap also wrote a lengthy "essay" on the occasion of the anniversary which was published in installments in the Hanoi press on 20 and 21 December and broadcast by Hanoi radio. The essay, entitled "Invincible Strength of the Vietnamese People's War in the New Era," is not yet available in translation.

VPA anniversary festivities also included receptions in honor of visiting military delegations--one from the Soviet Union, led by Chief of the General Staff General V.G. Kulikov, and one from Laos, led by Thao Mun, chief of the Lao People's Liberation Army logistics department. Perhaps because the Chinese sent no delegation to balance Kulikov's presence, Hanoi dispatched a delegation to Peking for the anniversary, led by Major General Nguyen Quyet--identified by Peking as political commissar of the VPA military college.* The 20th army anniversary in 1964 prompted no such exchanges of delegations.

* Nguyen Quyet was identified as recently as last May as the political commissar for the Third Military Region--see the TRENDS of 15 May 1974, page 11.

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NFLSV CELEBRATES 14TH ANNIVERSARY, HOLDS PRESIDUM MEETING

Ceremonies marking the fourteenth anniversary of the 20 December 1960 founding of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (NFLSV) were similar to other nondecennial celebrations. The meeting in the "liberated area" was held at an unspecified location in Quang Tri Province on the 19th and was attended by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who delivered the main address, Vietnam Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao, the Provisional Revolutionary Government's Vice President Nguyen Doa, and other NFLSV and PRG officials. PRG President Huyen Tan Phat was not reported as attending for the first time in at least five years. The DRV celebration in Hanoi was held as usual the day before, on the 18th. Sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) and the PRG special representation in the DRV, the meeting's participants included Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee Secretary Xuan Thuy, and VFF official Hoang Minh Giam, who was the main speaker.*

PRESIDIUM MEETING Coincident with the observance of the NFLSV anniversary, the NFLSV convened an "enlarged" meeting of the Front Central Committee Presidium on 13 and 14 December. According to a Liberation Radio report on the 17th, the conference was attended by all members of the Presidium and Secretariat and "many members" of the NFLSV Central Committee. With Nguyen Huu Tho presiding, the conferees heard reports on the situation in the South, the war, the building of the liberated areas, the struggle movement in the cities, and the diplomatic efforts of the PRG. As at the anniversary celebration, Huyen Tan Phat was not reported in attendance--his presence was neither noted by media reports nor the conference's 15 December communique. The Presidium is on record as having met on four previous occasions in the past six years--in early December 1968, in early August 1969, on 1-2 November 1972, and on 2-3 November 1973--and Phat was reported as participating in all but the 1968 session.

PRG'S ADMINISTRATIVE, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS The Press and Information Department of the PRG Foreign Ministry has issued a lengthy "basic document" whose 5 December release date suggests timing in preparation for the NFLSV anniversary. Entitled "The PRG, the Sole Legitimate Representative of the South Vietnamese

* The Hanoi celebration on the 10th anniversary in 1970 was marked by the attendance of top DRV leaders including First Secretary Le Duan, Premier Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

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People," the document is largely a replay of standard arguments on the PRG's legitimacy.

In recapitulating the administrative breakdown under the PRG, the document referred to a supraprovincial level of authority--the region (khu). The first known such reference was last October in a Liberation Radio report on the establishment of a "regional people's revolutionary committee" for Western Nam Bo (the southern most region of South Vietnam.) According to the October broadcast, the decision to "transform the PRG regional representations into regional people's revolutionary committees" was contained in a PRG Council of Ministers resolution adopted in July--a resolution not known to have been publicized. Following the October broadcast on the establishment of the committee for Western Nam Bo, the media have announced similar committees for Eastern Nam Bo and Southern Trung Bo, the two regions directly north of Saigon.

The document's discussion of the administrative subdivisions in the South stated that the "revolutionary administration" has a "power apparatus" of five levels: the central government, regional, municipal and provincial, district, and village or urban ward. These levels have, according to the document, been set up in six regions, 44 provinces, six major municipalities, 200 cities, district capitals, or townships, 230 districts, and 2,500 villages. Except for the newly announced regions, similar claims have been made in the past. For example, PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh in a June 1973 interview with a Hanoi newspaper declared that the PRG had administrations in "44 provinces and six major municipalities."

PRG territorial control in the South has once again been pegged at four-fifths of the entire area. In claiming this amount of territory for the communists, the document--and a 20 December LPA editorial marking the anniversary--has revived a figure often used prior to 1971 for describing the extent of PRG supremacy. Since then, territorial claims have customarily been couched in nonspecific generalities such as the "greater part of the South," and "vast areas." However, Mme Binh in interviews with the foreign press--the Swedish paper VAN on 7 February 1974 and the Bulgarian paper RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 13 August--declared that the liberated zone covered three-quarters of South Vietnam.

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HANOI CONVENES FIFTH SESSION OF FOURTH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Hanoi media have reported the opening of the fifth session of the DRV Fourth National Assembly on 23 December, noting that the National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh delivered his usual opening address and that Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi read the Council of Ministers report on the direction and tasks of the 1975 state plan." Truong Chinh somberly observed, without elaboration, that the session was being held at a time when "our people are ending a year replete with hardships and difficulties." Despite these unnamed adversities, he declared that "great achievements" had been scored in all fields. He also said that the current session will "resolve certain problems" concerning preparations for the election of the Fifth National Assembly to take place in 1975. Holding the elections next year conforms to the constitutional provision that a new national assembly be elected every four years--the last having been elected in April 1971.

Le Thanh Nghi's speech--which has thus far only been received in brief summary--recounted the "successful" implementation of the 1974 state plan, set forth the main economic tasks for 1975, and discussed measures to improve socialist production relations and management of the state and the economy. Admitting that North Vietnam is facing "many difficulties," Nghi at the same time asserted that there are also "many basic advantages" and went on to predict "even greater successes" in building the North, completing the southern revolution, and advancing toward national reunification. Nghi was essaying the role of main speaker at the National Assembly for only the second time, having replaced the traditional keynoter, Premier Pham Van Dong, at the last assembly session in February 1974.

Hanoi reported that other officials at the session included President Ton Duc Thang and Politburo members Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Hoang Van Hoan. A communique of the National Assembly Standing Committee broadcast by Hanoi radio on 16 December gave the first indication of the new session when it reported that a regular meeting of the committee held that same day had approved preparatory plans for the fifth session, but without specifying when it would be held. According to the DRV constitution adopted in 1959, the National Assembly should meet twice a year--a principle that has rarely been honored since the escalation of the war in 1965. The periodicity of the sessions has been closer to an annual basis than semiannual; for example, the Fourth National Assembly was convened in June 1971, but the second session did not meet until March 1972, the third (a special session to mark the signing of the Paris agreement), not until February 1973, and the fourth, a full year later in February 1974.

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HANOI CHARGES U.S. "PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN" ON MISSING PERSONNEL

Hanoi has reacted in standard fashion to recent U.S. urgings that more information be released on U.S. personnel missing in action. A mildly-worded 23 December DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement protested that the United States has launched a "distorted propaganda campaign" which accuses the DRV and PRG of failing to cooperate in the search for the missing personnel. According to the statement, the United States government is motivated in this effort by a desire to divert U.S. public opinion and conceal its "sabotage" of the Paris agreement, its "involvement" in South Vietnam, and its attempts to aid the GVN.

While not directly denying the veracity of the U.S. charges that it described, the statement sought to leave an impression of DRV compassion for the relatives of the men missing by recounting Hanoi's willingness in letting the United States receive the remains of its pilots who died while captive in the North. A similar tack was taken last August in DRV media comment in response to what was then termed "slandorous statements" by U.S. officials on the issue of the missing in action. At that time, the propaganda was likewise at pains to defend the DRV's "long-standing humanitarian policy" with regard to POW's and those missing in action.*

The current statement concluded by pointing out that the four-party Joint Military Commission has not yet worked out an agreement on the principles and specific procedures needed for effecting the searches and implied that, unless the United States fulfills the main provisions of the Paris agreement, it must bear the responsibility for the lack of progress in obtaining information on the missing.

* For a discussion of the earlier comment on the issue of missing personnel, see the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 21-22.

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K O R E A

DPRK ATTACKS U.S. "NUCLEAR WAR PREPARATIONS," ROLE AT UNGA

Pyongyang's low-key allegations concerning the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea--initiated in early October--were raised to an official level with the release of a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 20 December. The statement cited "recently published" U.S. Congressional testimony to document its charges that the United States has deployed "numerous nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons" near the truce line and is planning to turn South Korea into a "nuclear attack base." KCNA on the same day said the "recent" Congressional testimony had been given before a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and made public on 9 December. KCNA reported that the North Korean representative at the Military Armistice Commission meeting that day also had denounced the "U.S. imperialist aggressors" for "preparing for the provocation of a nuclear war in Korea by storing nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs in South Korea."

Pyongyang's first comment on the nuclear issue had been sparked by the release in early October of Congressional testimony by retired U.S. Admiral La Rocque regarding U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia. In addition to radio and press commentaries in the ensuing weeks, Pyongyang reported the raising of the issue at the last three Military Armistice Commission meetings. And in late October, the North Korean-Chinese side of the commission sent protest letters on the subject to the UN Command and to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The campaign waned in November, and the nuclear issues was given virtually no attention in routine DPRK comment on President Ford's trip to South Korea on 22-23 November. However, the Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the nuclear issue did in fact bring in the President's trip.

After asserting that the world now knows that the United States has long been bringing tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea, the spokesman said: "Just a short time ago, Ford, the chieftain of the U.S. imperialists, sneaked into South Korea, where, completely discarding his mask of peace, he actively goaded the South Korean bellicose elements into war provocations." The statement then went on to charge that South Korea was planning to procure an "atomic reactor needed for the production of nuclear weapons." Pyongyang first raised this issue on 20 November, when KCNA repeated similar charges made by a Japanese organization concerning Seoul's alleged attempt to borrow money from Japan for the purchase of Canadian reactors. A 16 December statement issued by several North Korean

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political groups had also made the connection between a reactor and nuclear arms for the South. A 14 December NODONG SINMUN commentary and a 17 December Pyongyang radio commentary, however, had said only that the reactor would produce "nuclear material," without specifying weapons. Unlike these two commentaries, the foreign ministry spokesman's statement did not link Japan with the South's procurement of a reactor.

U.S. ROLE IN UN A second foreign ministry spokesman's statement, issued on 24 December in connection with the conclusion of the UN debate on the Korean question, largely echoed previous Pyongyang media comment in criticizing the U.S. role. The statement called the 9 December tie vote in the General Assembly's First Committee on the North Korean-backed resolution a heavy "political and moral defeat" for the United States. It claimed that until U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea there cannot be peace or security in either Korea or Asia, and thanked the cosponsors of the resolution for their support.

The statement adopted an approach not seen before in the North's comment on the issue in claiming that the United States, unable to justify its presence in the South under UN aegis, had "reluctantly" introduced a resolution "pretending" to look toward discussions on dissolving the UN Command. Without elaboration, the statement protested that since the U.S.-backed resolution referred the question to the UN Security Council, it only revealed the "unchanged ulterior design" of the United States to avert withdrawing its troops from the South. Echoing earlier Pyongyang comment on the final vote, the statement vowed the DPRK would "never tolerate" any UN resolution justifying U.S. troop presence in South Korea.

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CHINA

YANG CHENG-WU, OTHERS NAMED AS DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF

Yang Cheng-wu, PLA acting chief of staff until his purge in 1968, was identified as a deputy chief of staff by NCNA on 21 December, in reports of Peking festivities hailing the 30th anniversary of the Vietnam People's Army. Yang appeared on several occasions during the celebrations and hosted a banquet for the visiting DRV military delegation. Yang's return to the PLA general staff, which has had no chief since the purge of Huang Yung-sheng in 1971, had been signaled by NCNA on 7 December when it placed Yang at the top of a list of PLA leaders attending a funeral, directly ahead of two deputy chiefs of staff.

Also on the 21st, NCNA named Ho Cheng-wen, a deputy military region commander in Chengtu, as a deputy chief of staff. He was a Chengtu deputy commander prior to the cultural revolution, but dropped out of sight during the cultural revolution and did not reappear until April 1977 in Chengtu. He has spent most of the past year in Peking, but was identified as a Chengtu deputy commander as recently as October. Two other deputy chiefs of staff have been identified in the past two weeks. Wang Shang-jung, general staff operations director prior to the cultural revolution, was cited in the post by NCNA on 9 December, and on 16 December NCNA referred to Hu Wei, who was first identified as a leading member of the PLA on Army Day this year after serving as a civilian leader in Shensi, as a deputy chief of staff.

The new appointments, building up the central military command structure, seem likely to further reduce the influence of the military region commanders, whose power was already much lessened last year when most of them were transferred out of their bases to new commands. No regional commander now holds the concurrent post of provincial party chief. In the two provinces where new party first secretaries have been designated, Kwangtung and Shantung, the posts were given to civilians. The same pattern seems to have been followed in Kiangsu, where civilian Peng Chung was identified as chairman of the revolutionary committee by NCNA on 19 December. All provincial party chiefs now hold that office concurrently. Peng has served as a deputy party secretary and revolutionary committee chairman in the province and jumped over two senior party secretaries with military connections to gain the top post.

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Perhaps coincidentally, the two provinces where new civilian secretaries have replaced departed commanders recently instructed field armies to follow the lead of provincial party committees. Field armies are under military region jurisdiction, and were not known to be subordinate to any provincial-level authority. But on 21 November a Canton NANFANG DAILY editorial ordered field armies to follow provincial party direction in handling militia affairs. More recently, a Shantung PLA circular broadcast by Tsinan radio on 16 December told field armies to "consciously accept the leadership of the provincial party committee" when carrying out work in the localities.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

PEKING SIGNALS APPROVAL OF OPEN DEBATE ON HISTORICAL FIGURES

For the first time since the cultural revolution purges began in 1966, Peking has signaled approval of open debate on the role of historical figures. The public go-ahead for such a debate, involving contentious evaluations of leaders from the past and often obscure allegorical references to current PRC leaders, came in an NCNA report of 11 December on the contents of a new journal, soon to be released, entitled HISTORICAL STUDIES. NCNA noted that the journal would adhere to the lines of "making the past serve the present" and "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend." The hundred flowers theme was used by Mao in 1957 to spark debate, but was soon followed by a severe crackdown on debaters who went too far; in the period since the cultural revolution the "hundred flowers" phrase has appeared occasionally, but there has been little evidence of any widespread debate. The NCNA report stated that the journal's first issue would include articles presenting two different views of Tsao Tsao, a Three Kingdoms era leader who has been favorably appraised during the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign, and would begin "a discussion on the appraisal of Tsao Tsao."

The revival of public debate on history is consonant with a general shift in the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign away from mass struggle to academic struggle. At the same time the campaign has turned to a new emphasis on unity and economic production. The debate over history seems intended to keep the ideological struggle going, thus meeting the needs of Maoist theory, while not allowing it to affect conditions necessary for economic gains at a time when many provinces have already called for a new economic "leap forward."

Historical debate in China has a pattern of spreading far beyond academic fields, however. The use of analogy between figures of past and present leaders has been especially controversial. Most major PRC political movements have followed hard on the heels of an academic debate, and the cultural revolution itself was sparked by an attack on a historical drama which seemed to assail Mao by analogy. Even without public debate, the anti-Confucius campaign literature has provided diverse opinions of historical characters and incidents, some of which seem to reflect current struggles

Two articles which appeared in PRC periodicals in November illustrate the problems involved in using historical analogies to

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elucidate current debates. An article by Chai Ching in the Shanghai journal STUDY AND CRITICISM that favorably assessed the role of Taoism during the early Western Han dynasty seemed on its face to plead that Mao's wife Chiang Ching be allowed the title of ruler in return for agreeing to give power to Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. An article by Lo Szu-ting in RED FLAG (No. 11) seemed on the other hand to accuse Chiang of collusion with regional leaders and the Russians.

Closer examination of the article and of previous works by the two authors, however, casts doubt on both interpretations. Chai's article in STUDY AND CRITICISM seemed to furnish clear analogies with current personalities in discussing the successful leadership succession system of the early Han, the dynasty credited by PRC historians with consolidating the overthrow of the slave system by the feudal system. Chai recalled the achievements of dynastic founder Liu Pang and his Prime Minister Hsiao Ho and noted that after their deaths Liu's widow Empress Lu, "according to Liu Pang's wishes," appointed Tsao Shen as second prime minister of the dynasty. Tsao, one of Liu's generals who changed his political views while holding a previous civil post, "made no changes at all" and closely followed the rules of his predecessor. Liu Pang's son, the young Emperor Wei, who "failed to understand" Tsao's purpose, was allowed no power.

The historical analogies seem clear--Liu Pang is Mao; Hsiao Ho is Chou; Empress Lu is Chiang Ching; Tsao Shen is Teng Hsiao-ping; and Emperor Wei would probably be either Yao Wen-yuan or Wang Hung-wen. But Chai's message is less certain. The content of the article and Chai's previous published articles make it seem unlikely that he is one of the Chiang Ching's cultural cadres pleading that she be allowed titular leadership in return for not interfering in the affairs of state. Chai wrote several previous articles during the ideological campaign, including a previous STUDY AND CRITICISM article in May 1974, a RED FLAG article in November 1973, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY article in August 1974. The latter two articles dealt with teaching materials and the theory of knowledge, stressing the importance of book learning while noting that such knowledge must not be divorced from practical application. Chai's previous STUDY AND CRITICISM article, a study of the legalist Han Fei of the Warring States period, concentrated on Han's administrative reforms.

Lo Szu-ting's article, in RED FLAG No. 11, noted that Sung Empress Dowager Kao supported those who opposed the reforms of Prime Minister Wang An-shih, and that those "diehards" whom she supported

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were responsible for abandoning large tracts of land to aggressors on the northern borders. The analogy would thus seem to indict Chiang Ching for supporting forces advocating conciliation of the Soviet Union. However, Lo has at least twice referred favorably to the role of the Empress Lu, and in RED FLAG No. 8 he specifically noted the opposition of Liu Pang and the Empress Lu to local secessionist forces who wanted to surrender to the "slaveowner aristocrats of the Huns to the north of China." Thus either Lo has made a very abrupt about-face, or not all of his references to empresses refer to Chiang Ching.

CHAI-LO DIFFERENCES

While it is inconclusive whether Chai and Lo disagree on the status of Chiang Ching, there are decided differences between the two on the historical role of Taoism, a debate with general implications for the question of successfully handing down power. Lo's three articles on the Chin- early Han period concentrated on the Chin's failure to be sufficiently harsh, and they condemned compromise. Chai's current article, on the other hand, makes a virtue of eclecticism and argues strongly that consolidation of a regime following the transfer of power from one class to another requires stability. Chai's emphasis on stability seems generally consonant with Peking's recent stress that the ideological campaign turn toward unity and production, but he skirts dangerously close to dispensing with Mao's theory of intraclass contradictions.

Chai traces the history of the early Han--with special mention given to the role played by yet another empress dowager--to illustrate that the system worked; he declares that the Marxist assessment of a theory is determined by how well it meets the requirements of social practice. He concludes that the Han system of legalism under the cloak of Taoism met "the objective condition in which a stable situation was needed by the landlord class to consolidate its position." Chai pulls back from presenting the situation as completely stable, however, noting the occurrence of "zigzag struggles" and criticizing "local secessionist forces."

Chai's specific approval of Taoism as a means to an end, and his sanctioning of the doctrine of inactivity, even for a special case, puts him out of the mainstream of comment during the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign. According to Chai, Taoism originally appeared during the Spring and Autumn period, when it represented the "lower stratum" of the slaveowning class which was opposed to the Confucianism of the slaveowning aristocrats. To drive home his point, Chai stresses Laotzu's opposition to Confucianism, states

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that "in criticizing the Confucianists at this point" the Taoist and legalist schools were relatively close together, and even claims that "the legalists approved of Taoism, while the Confucianists opposed Taoism."

Chai's assessment is completely at odds with that of Lo Szu-ting, who warned in RED FLAG No. 4 of 1974 against eclectic, reactionary trends of thought. While Lo has not specifically addressed himself to Taoism of the early Han period, his comments on Taoism generally, including mentions of Laotzu and Chin dynasty Taoism, vary sharply from Chai's assessment. Lo's article in RED FLAG No. 4 attacked the Taoist idea of "doing nothing" and presented it as an ally of Confucianism because it reflected a desire to return to the past. Lo recalled that one of Emperor Chin Shih Huang's prime ministers, Lu Pu-wei, asked the emperor to become an inactive puppet and allow Lu to rule. With obvious reference to attempts to get Mao to retire, Lo pointed out that such an action would have paved the way for the return of Confucianism. Lo also showed little respect for stability, criticizing the nominalist school of thought for saying that "when the country is governed in the nominalist and legalist way, nothing will be disturbed." According to Lo, this illustrated the nominalist fault of "reconciliation and compromise." Lo's first article during the anti-Confucian campaign, in the same November 1973 issue of RED FLAG as Chai's first article, had also criticized Lu Pu-wei, noting that he superficially accommodated all schools of thought but essentially represented the Confucian school "and also adopted the Taoist school." That article also presented both schools as essentially favoring the continued rule of the decadent slaveowning class.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16 - 22 DECEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2441 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1036 items)</u>	
Supreme Soviet Session	(--) 13%	UNGA Session	(20%) 11%
European CP Conference	(--) 6%	Zaire President Mobutu	(--) 10%*
Preparatory Meeting, Budapest		in PRC	
China	(5%) 5%	Vietnam	(2%) 8%
14th NFLSV Anniversary	(--) 4%	[30th VPA Anniver-	(--) 5%]
TASS Statement on USSR-U.S.	(--) 2%	sary	
Economic, Trade Relations		PRC-Gambia Diplomatic	(--) 5%
		Relations	
		USSR	(1%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Mobutu.